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as a means of ‘diagnosing’ philosophic ailments. Engaging with
themes and thinkers in the analytic tradition, such as Gottlob
Frege, Donald Davidson, Gareth Evans, and Michael Dum-
mett, McDowell’s approach consists of “exposing mistaken
assumptions in pictures which have held us captive in their grip
and, once we have realized the error of our way of seeing
things, it puts forward new pictures” (S.M. Dingli, On Thinking
and the World, 2005, p.195). For example, in his book Mind and
World (1996), McDowell says that if we picture the conceptual
realm as an expanse bounded by the implications of experience,
we will expect justification to reach beyond that fabric, thus
attempting the impossible. Notice that this refutation is made
by means of images, not arguments.
Judged by the quantity of scholarly attention he has
received, McDowell is a successful philosopher. However, in
Reading McDowell (N.S. Smith, ed., 2002), Crispin Wright fears
that McDowell might be bringing back “barriers of jargon,
convolution, and metaphor” which Wright thinks have been
absent since “the academic professionalization of the subject.”
In an attempt to safeguard “the care and rigor which we try to
instill into our students,” Wright warns those students that
“McDowell is a strong swimmer, but his stroke is not to be
imitated.” McDowell’s response in the same book is: “If ana-
lytic philosophy prohibits imagery except for rare special effect,
and precludes letting the full import of a term... emerge gradu-
ally in the course of using it, as opposed to setting down a defi-
nition at the start, I do not care if I am not an analytic philoso-
pher.” McDowell is clearly unfazed by the fact that Wright
“drums [him] out of the regiment of analytic philosophers” –
an amused expression he borrows from Richard Rorty, “who of
course often gets his epaulettes slashed off.” 
“I hope there will always be, included in philosophy, a kind of literature
which I could not by any possibility write.”
C. I. Lewis, The Philosophy of C. I. Lewis (1968), ed. P.A. Schilpp.
One of the big philosophical questions is: How shouldone do philosophy? Sir Karl Popper gave a permissiveanswer when he wrote that “There is no method pecu-
liar to philosophy” (preface to his Logic of Scientific Discovery,
1934). Popper might well be right. Even so, the needs of com-
munication clearly impose some need for uniformity. Hence,
every author exposed to the flows of both negative and positive
reinforcement about how to write philosophy has nurtured a
little homunculus – a censor that sits atop their shoulder, and, in
advance of any exposure to scrutiny by their peers, dispenses
advice about possible choices of words and phrases. This is a fate
common to philosophy students. With this in mind, we can
clearly discern two major strands in current philosophy – the so-
called ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ traditions. This philosophical
double-entry book-keeping has been going on for a century
now. Philosophers who want to be peacemakers sometimes deny
the existence of this division, but I find it rather hard to doubt so
blatant a fact. Beyond their predilections for certain subject-
matters, each side has its own classic texts, heroes, and villains.
These dictate ahead of inquiry not only what properly counts as
an interesting topic, but what is an interesting way of tackling it. 
Stylistic Differences
Now one claim reiterated with increasing frequency and
boldness in both print and electronic media by some analytic
philosophers is that what sets their camp apart is a shared
adherence to ‘professional’ standards. Implicitly, it is implied
that continental thinkers are not ‘professional’ in what they do;
or if they are, that their skills are literary rather than philo-
sophical in nature. Literature can be a powerful medium for
the communication of ideas. However, when analytic philoso-
phers say that they have moved beyond literature, they con-
sider it a boast: the ‘literary’ label is used to denigrate conti-
nental thinkers, who therefore do not need to be taken seri-
ously. American philosopher Brian Leiter, for instance, writes
on his popular blog that he is “genuinely hopeful that over the
next generation Party Line Continentalists will be exiled
entirely to literature departments.”
Analytical argumentation is also often thought to differenti-
ate the different schools of philosophy. Some major figures of
the continental tradition, such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Hei-
degger, Lacan, and Derrida have favoured a non-argumenta-
tive [that is, a non-analytical] approach. Yet, if argumentation
is about making a point, and if the same point can be made
without it, then employing argumentation does not seem
mandatory for philosophy. Consider the work of John
McDowell, who is noted for his reliance on inventive imagery
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The ‘Professionalisation’ of Philosophy
For many people, the expression ‘professional philosopher’
sounds like an oxymoron, so calls for expulsion from its ranks
can seem puzzling. Strictly speaking, all one needs to do to
establish one’s pedigree as a ‘professional philosopher’ is to
provide evidence that one is salaried in that capacity. Anyone
familiar with the history of the discipline cannot help but
notice some irony here, since for Plato, one of the Founding
Fathers of Western philosophy, the obtaining of monetary
reward for their thought automatically disqualified someone
from being a true ‘lover of wisdom’, and made them a Sophist.
Perhaps a good way to describe the current situation would be
to say that this classical standard has now been turned com-
pletely on its head. However, given that the majority of
thinkers writing in the continental tradition are also employed
in academia, the analytic proponent cannot appeal to the bare
criterion of remuneration in order to cordon off her rivals.
It is always other professionals who decide who counts as a
professional. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), the
philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn stressed the role that
such clubbishness plays in ensuring the cohesion of disciplines
(in his study it was scientific disciplines, but the point may be
applied generally). Through his distinction between ‘normal’
and ‘revolutionary’ science, Kuhn showed that there are long
interludes when communities of scientists are committed to not
questioning their shared core assumptions. 
The analytic philosophers at Kuhn’s university largely dis-
missed him as a philosophical lightweight: when he applied for
tenure, they relegated him to a history department. I neverthe-
less think Kuhn’s ideas have had a lasting impact on how the
analytic tradition sees itself. Indeed, in a Kuhnian manner,
between short-lived episodes of turmoil, are lengthy periods
where the philosophical status quo reigns supreme and rival
proposals are debarred outright. And further, in the hands of
analytic philosophers, who see their central goal as the piece-
meal clarification of linguistic confusions, Kuhn’s notion of a
paradigm of shared core assumptions can vindicate their asser-
tion of the special value of their goal and its method. 
Analytic philosophers have often been reproached for the
remoteness of their technical craft, but somewhere along the
way they have figured out that if they band together tightly
enough, their way of perceiving philosophy can be imperme-
able to such external criticisms. Philosophers are suspicious of
circularity in arguments (we consider it a fallacy, in fact), but we
should be suspicious of institutional circularity too. Thus, with-
out checks and balances from the outside (or a dose of open-
minded humility on their own behalf), for philosophers fixated
on displaying appropriate markers, their self-serving idea of
professionalism can easily create “a self-perpetuating clique,
like freemasons” (Jonathan Rée, Radical Philosophy #1, 1972).  
When one finds conformity on such a large scale, there are
usually channels of communication involved. Faculty selection
and student admission committees are important gears in the
reproduction of professional academic structures. Another typi-
cal dispatcher of consensus about professional philosophy
among non-continental academics is the Philosophical Gourmet
Report – a biannual listing which ranks universities exclusively on
the basis of the name recognition that their philosophy faculty
generates. Generally, in an electronic sea of texts, rankings based
on peer opinions have become the main compass of respectabil-
ity for many academic philosophers. Naturally, when the
appraised are the appraisers, the assessments tend to be positive.
The Gourmet website itself goes as far as stating that “‘analytic’
philosophy is now largely coextensional with good philosophy
and scholarship.” Yet as Hans-Johann Glock writes in his book
What is Analytic Philosophy? (2008), “just as theists should not be
allowed to define God into existence, analytical philosophers
should not be allowed to define themselves into excellence.”
An Anti-Continental Missile...
As a case study precisely of analytic philosophers defining
philosophical value into existence, consider Mario Bunge’s
Philosophical Dictionary (2003). Yet rather than defining analytic
philosophy into excellence, Bunge defines continental philoso-
phy into mediocrity. Here for instance is his entry for a staple
continental notion, Martin Heidegger’s Dasein:
“DASEIN: Being-there. The trademark of existentialism. In some texts,
Dasein = Real existence. In others, Dasein = Human existence. In still others
Dasein = Consciousness. The hermeneutic difficulty is compounded by the
recurrent phrase “das Sein des Daseins,” i.e., the being of being-there.
Related terms not yet used by existentialists: Hiersein (Being-here), Dortsein
(Being-over-there), Irgendwosein (Being-somewhere), and Nirgendwosein
(Being-nowhere)… Jetztsein (Being-now), Dannsein (Being-then), Irgend-
wannsein (Being-sometime), and Niemalssein (Being-never)… Note how
natural these combinations sound in German, and how clumsy their Eng-
lish counterparts sound. Which proves that German (when suitably macer-
ated) is the ideal language for existentialism. A number of deep metaphysi-
cal questions involving these concepts can be framed. For example, ‘Was ist
der Sinn des Dawannseienden?’ (What is the sense of Being-there-whenness?)
‘Was ist das Sein des Nirgendniemalsseins?’ (What is the being of Being-never-
nowhereness?)… A systematic exploration of this vast family of expressions
might lead to a considerable extension of existentialism.”
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This passage is funny, but also telling. It is significant that
the mockery was regarded as permissible or appropriate, and
that the target is deemed sufficiently discredited, and so the
attack not likely to attract any significant opprobrium. And it is
not merely that Dasein was not regarded worthy of a serious
entry in a dictionary of philosophy (a dictionary not qualified as
‘analytic’, but announced as ‘philosophy’ tout court); rather, the
notion was displayed as a comical counterpoint, to exemplify by
way of contrast what a ‘good’, that is, an analytic, notion might
look like. It is however unfortunate that Bunge did not make
the effort to comprehend what is at stake in Dasein. He is per-
spicacious enough to observe that the term is applied equally to
‘Real existence’, ‘Human existence’, and ‘Consciousness’; then
he hastily glosses these multiple meanings as a weakness. But
that, as it happens, is Heidegger’s point: Real existence is
Human existence, and Consciousness cannot be divorced from it.
Much current cognitive science, with its emphasis on embodi-
ment and situated cognition, is slowly confirming this view. In
fact, the title of Andy Clark’s influential 1997 book on robotics,
Being There, is a nod to Dasein.
Bunge’s pot-shot was aimed at an established target. In a
1932 paper on ‘The Elimination of Metaphysics through a
Logical Analysis of Language’, Rudolph Carnap singled out
excerpts from Heidegger’s writing and subjected them to simi-
lar analytic criticism – showing how, for example, Heidegger
uses certain words as both a substantive and a verb – a major
offence for Carnap (who, I assume, would also have to rescue
us from the deleterious influence of the word ‘fish’). So choos-
ing to belittle Dasein is not at all a risky move analytically; in
fact, it is arguably more a rite of passage amongst analytic
philosophers – even though Gilbert Ryle recalls that, in the
days when such dismissals were first being ritualized, “most of
us had never seen a copy of [Heidegger’s] Sein und Zeit” (Ryle,
O.P. Wood and G. Pitcher, eds., 1960).
...That Can Bounce Right Back
Like Carnap, Bunge is obviously bothered by the prospect
of adopting methods of thought that lead to vacuous exercises
in wordplay, and evidently thinks that continental schools, as
exemplified by Heidegger, have foundered into such verbiage.
When he writes that “A systematic exploration of this vast
family of expressions might lead to a considerable extension of
existentialism,” the growth alluded to is clearly considered
intellectually malignant. Gratuitously combining arbitrary
notions and then exploring the myriad interrelations that
ensue, is thus a methodological perversion.
Bunge suggests that such expansion is endemic of the conti-
nental tradition. Maybe it is. However, excess verbal growth is
endemic of the analytic tradition too. To show this, let me
parody Bunge’s dictionary entry. Take a word – any word (the
more banal the better). Add to it the suffix -ism. It is then no
longer a word, but a philosophical position, which can be scru-
tinised by the analytic intellect. In this way, any word can
demonstrate the analytic method in a similar way to how
Bunge defined Dasein. (Should this position carve out a space
no one occupies, this need cause no worry: the -ism can yield
anonymous –ists, defined as people who would uphold the rele-
vant tenets.) Were we to pick the word ‘juxtaposition’, for
instance, we could obtain the following analysis:
“JUXTAPOSITIONISM: A stance in the philosophy of such-and-such.
We may distinguish between two forms of juxtapositionism: weak juxtapo-
sitionism and strong juxtapositionism. The weak juxtapositionist differs
from the strong juxtapositionist in that she does not endorse the thesis that
juxtapositionism should be seen in realist terms. The strong juxtaposition-
ist is more ontologically committed, holding that juxtaposition entails not
only instrumental, but real, consequences, and thus betokens a true state of
affairs. Recent debate has focused on whether weak juxtapositionism is
internally consistent. A more moderate re-evaluation has sought to retain
the basic features of weak juxtapositionism whilst incorporating some of
the realist commitments of strong juxtapositionism. There thus
emerges a more sophisticated mixed juxtapositionism. The chief
desideratum of the mixed view is to buttress itself against the accusa-
tion of dogmatism while retaining the basic ideas. This view has
yielded a fruitful juxtaposition-theoretic template whence future
developments can unfold. A systematic exploration of this vast
uncharted field might lead to a considerable extension of juxtaposi-
tionism generally.”
The analytic tradition is replete with such verbiage, gratu-
itously combining notions and then exhaustively exploring
the myriad interrelations that ensue. What is the difference
between this example and the previous one about Dasein?
It is too simplistic to claim that the analytic tradition
engages in professional philosophy whilst the continental
tradition trades merely in literature. On the contrary, I
would argue that, when a discipline isn’t held together
merely by nepotism, the grasp of its subject matter can be
articulated in more than one idiom, and so exiling dissi-
dents becomes unnecessary.
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